The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances Before the First World War by Gregory D. Miller

Author:Gregory D. Miller
Language: eng
Format: mobi, pdf
Tags: World War I, International Relations, History & Theory, General, Political Science, Security (National & International), Military, History
ISBN: 9780801464607
Publisher: Cornell
Published: 2011-12-09T13:58:31+00:00

Consequences of Russian Behavior

The conventional view of the First Moroccan Crisis was that German actions, intended to drive a wedge between France and its allies, instead brought France, Russia, and England into a more intimate relationship. Although this may be true, I contend that France and Russia drew closer not only out of concern for the growing German threat but also because of declining perceptions of each other’s reliability. I also suggest that the increased delegation between Britain and France was surpassed by the degree with which France attempted to bind Russia after the crisis.

Because Mercer argues that states always perceive their allies to have a negative reputation, France should not have been surprised by the limited Russian support and should not have considered withdrawing from the alliance nor demanded a more binding agreement. Therefore, any changes to the Dual Alliance challenge Mercer’s arguments on this and support my hypotheses on alliance variation, particularly, if, as I suggest, Russia suffered more for its mixed support than England did for its full support.

Russia’s support for France was clearly strategic, based on a desire to gain access to the straits and its need for French financial assistance rather than any sense of obligation to an ally.58 That does not mean that French (and even British) perceptions of Russian reliability would not change. The evidence suggests that Russia’s mixed support for France during the crisis resulted in more binding changes than those that were made between England and France.

The changes made in the Franco-Russian relationship—especially Russia’s willingness to accept a French general as an adviser to the Russian government59—show not only that France requested a higher level of military integration with Russia but also that Russia was willing to give up some of its autonomy to preserve the alliance with France. For the French, this increased delegation was intended to make it more difficult for Russia to abandon France in the next crisis, or in a war. In addition, the meeting between the Russian and French General Staffs was clearly meant to send a signal to the Germans about the strength of the Franco-Russian relationship; but perhaps more important was the assurance that it provided to France about Russian reliability. In contrast, the British merely participated in military conversations with the French, which the British even viewed as increasing their freedom of action, since it provided a greater possibility of fighting with France if the British chose to do so.

Taking a step back, I suggest that Russia’s actions, even though they affected French perceptions of Russian reliability, were also a consequence of past French behavior, particularly France’s inaction during the Russo-Japanese War.60 That Russia initially entered into negotiations for an alliance with Germany in October 1904 supports this argument, even though these negotiations ended without an agreement because the Russians were unwilling at that time to ally with Germany without French approval.61 Not only did the Russians consider another agreement with Germany while Germany initiated a crisis with France but the lukewarm support

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